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ABSTRACT 
The complexity of large-scale network systems made of a large number of nonlinearly interconnected components is a 
restrictive facet for their modeling and analysis. In this paper, we propose a framework of hierarchical modeling of a 
complex network system, based on a recursive unsupervised spectral clustering method. The hierarchical model serves 
the purpose of facilitating the management of complexity in the analysis of real-world critical infrastructures. We ex- 
emplify this by referring to the reliability analysis of the 380 kV Italian Power Transmission Network (IPTN). In this 
work of analysis, the classical component Importance Measures (IMs) of reliability theory have been extended to render 
them compatible and applicable to a complex distributed network system. By utilizing these extended IMs, the reliabil- 
ity properties of the IPTN system can be evaluated in the framework of the hierarchical system model, with the aim of 
providing risk managers with information on the risk/safety significance of system structures and components. 
 
Keywords: Complex Network System; Hierarchical Modeling; Spectral Clustering; Extended Importance Measure 
1. Introduction 
Critical infrastructures are engineered distributed systems 
which provide the fundamental support to modern Indus- 
try and society. Examples are computer and communica- 
tion systems, power transmission and distribution sys- 
tems, rail and road transportation systems, oil/gas sys- 
tems and water distribution systems. Failures of such sys- 
tems can have multiple, transnational impacts of signifi- 
cant size [1-3]. Hence, identifying and quantifying the 
reliability and vulnerability of such systems is crucial for 
designing the adequate protections, mitigation and emer- 
gency actions against failures [2]. 
These systems are exposed to multiple hazards and 
threats, some of which are even unexpected and emer- 
gent, and consist of a large number of elements whose 
interactions are not easily modeled and quantified, so that 
a complete analysis by exhaustive treatment cannot be 
pursued. As a result, the performance and reliability as- 
sessment of such “complex” systems has proved to be a 
non-trivial task in practice. 
Recent studies suggest that many real complex net- 
work systems exhibit a modularized organization [4,5]. 
In many cases, these modularized structures are found to 
correspond to functional units within networks (ecologi- 
cal niches in food webs, modules in biochemical net- 
works) [6]. Broadly speaking, clusters (also called com- 
munities or modules) are found in the network, forming 
groups of elements that are densely interconnected with 
each other but only sparsely connected with the rest of 
the network. Furthermore, hierarchically modularized or- 
ganization, which is a central idea for the life process in 
biology [5,7], is also found to characterize the internal 
structure of many technological networks [8]. This sparks 
the idea of utilizing the hierarchical, modularized struc- 
ture as a basis to model these complex systems, for their 
analysis and understanding [9]. 
In the analysis of systems with respect to their failure 
behavior, Importance Measures (IMs) are used to iden- 
tify the weak points and quantify the impact of compo- 
nent failures [10,11]. IMs provide numerical indicators to 
determine which components are most important for 
system reliability improvement or most critical for sys- 
tem failure. Many different IMs have been proposed in 
the literature [12,13], among which classical and relevant 
statistics are Birnbaum [14], Fussell-Vesely [15] and 
Criticality Importance [16,17]. However, none of these  
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Figure 1. The 380 kV Italian power transmission network. 
 
measures can be applied directly to complex network 
systems, because of the distributed character of function- 
ality and service that they provide.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold: firstly to propose 
a scheme of recursive clustering to obtain a hierarchical 
modeling framework associated with different varied- 
size grained virtual networks; then to introduce Extended 
Importance Measures (EIMs) which are compatible with 
the distributed characteristics of complex network sys- 
tems, to evaluate the components importance in the fra- 
mework of the hierarchical system representation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
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Section 2 presents the methodology of hierarchical mod- 
eling, taking the structure of the 380 kV Italian Power 
Transmission Network (IPTN) as an example for illustra- 
tion; in Section 3, the basic terminal-pair connection re- 
liability problem is first introduced, based on which the 
traditional IMs are extended and then calculated for the 
IPTN system; conclusions are drawn in Section 4. 
2. Hierarchical Modeling of Complex  
Network System 
2.1. Network Representation 
Graph Theory provides a framework for the mathemati- 
cal representation of complex networks. A graph is an 
ordered pair comprising a set of vertices (nodes) 
 together with a set of edges (also 
called arcs or links) , which are two- 
element subsets of V. The network structure is usually 
defined by the  adjacency matrix, which defines 
which two nodes are connected by assigning a 1 to the 
corresponding element of the matrix; otherwise, the va- 
lue in the matrix is 0 if there is no connection between 
the two nodes. As described, this type of graph is un- 
weighted and undirected. A graph is weighted if a value 
(weight) is assigned to each edge representing properties 
of the connection like cost, reliability, capacities, etc. For 
example, the matrix of physical distances is often used in 
conjunction with the adjacency matrix to describe a net- 
work also with respect to its spatial dimension [18,19]. 
 ,G V E
, Nv
N N
  1 2, ,V v v  1 2, , , ME e e e 
In this paper, we take for exemplification of the ana- 
lyses proposed the 380 kV Italian power transmission 
network (IPTN) (Figure 1). This network is a branch of 
the high-voltage-level transmission network, which can 
be modeled as a graph of  (127 nodesN  30GN   
generators and  distributors) connected by M = 
171 links [20,21], defined by its  adjacency ma- 
trix A whose entries ij   are 1 if there is an edge join- 
ing node i to node j or 0 otherwise. In Figure 1, the gen- 
erators, i.e. hydro and thermal power plants, are repre- 
sented by squares whereas the distribution substations are 
represented by circles. 
97DN 
a
N N

2.2. Construct Network Hierarchy by Successive 
Clustering 
Modularity is ubiquitous in many networks of scientific 
and technological interest, ranging from the World Wide 
Web to biological networks [7,22]. As a result, it is often 
possible to identify groups of elements that are highly 
interconnected with each other, but have only a few links 
to components outside of the group to which they belong 
to. These communities usually combine into each other 
in a hierarchical manner [7], in which nodes form groups 
and then join the groups of groups, and so forth, starting 
from the lowest levels of organization (individual nodes) 
up to the level of the entire system. This suggests the 
development of a hierarchical structure to describe a 
complex network system at different levels of resolution, 
with the aim of managing the complexity of the system 
more effectively.  
A successive Unsupervised Spectral Clustering Algo- 
rithm (USCA) [23], which is invariant to cluster shapes 
and densities and simple to implement, has been adopted 
in this study to build the hierarchical structure of the 
IPTN system. Cluster analysis aims at recognizing natu- 
ral groups within classes of entities [24]. The problem is 
to assign categories to unlabelled data, encouraging the 
search of implicit information in the network structure 
encoded in its graph [25]. Consequently, modularity pat- 
terns within a complex network system can be revealed 
without a priori knowledge of their existence. The de- 
tailed description of different clustering methods is be- 
yond the scope of this article. For a systematic and syn- 
thetic review, the reader is encouraged to look at [24-26]. 
The USCA makes use of the spectrum (eigenvalues) of 
the similarity matrix of the data to perform dimensional-
ity reduction before Fuzzy c-Means (FCM)—clustering 
in fewer dimensions. Schematically, it is performed by 
the steps [23] in Table 1. 
In the first step, the Laplacian matrix sym  is calcu- 
lated from the similarity (affinity) matrix as follows. The 
input similarity matrix  is of size n  and its ge- 
neric element ij
L
nS
s  represents the similarity between 
nodes i and j in the network. The diagonal components 
iis  are set to 1 and the matrix is symmetric  ij jis s . 
The degree matrix  is the diagonal matrix with di- 
agonal entries  defined by 
D
, ,1 2d d , nd
1
, 1, 2, ,
N
i ij
j
d s i

   n           (1) 
Then, the normalized graph Laplacian matrix can be 
obtained: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
symL D LD I D SD
            (2) 
where L D S   and I  is the identity matrix of size 
n n . 
By recursively operating the USCA on the data of the 
IPTN presented in Section 2.1 above, a 5-levels hierar- 
chical structure of the system is constructed which con- 
tains the complete system at the top and individual ele- 
ments at the bottom (the top panel of Figure 2 gives out 
the structure of the hierarchy, detailed in the first 3 lev- 
els). 
2.3. Hierarchical Modeling of the Network 
Based on the hierarchy structure resulting from the suc- 
cessive application of USCA, artificial networks can be 
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Table 1. Unsupervised spectral clustering algorithm. 
Input: Similarity matrix . n nS 
Compute the normalized graph Laplacian matrix symL . 
Compute the first k eigenvalues 1 2, , , k    and corresponding 
eigenvectors 1 2, , , ku u u of matrix symL . The first k eigenvalues 
are such that they are very small whereas λk+1 is relatively large. 
The number of clusters c is set equal to k, according to the 
eigengap heuristic theory [24]. 
Let  be the matrix containing the vectors n kU  1 2, , , ku u u  
as columns. Form the matrix n kT   from U by normalizing the 
rows to norm 1, that is set  1 22ij ij ikkt u u  . 
For  let be the vector corresponding to the 
i-th row of T. 
1, ,i n  kiy 
Resort to the FCM algorithm [27,28] to partition the data points 
  1, ,i i ny   into c = k clusters . 1, , kC C
Output: Clusters 1, , kA A with  i jA j y C   i
 
 
V1
(1)
V1
(2) 38
V2
(2) 17
V3
(2) 36
V4
(2) 36
E13
(2)
E14
(2)
E24
(2)
E34
(2)
V
1
(3) 13
V
2
(3) 13V3
(3) 12
V
4
(3) 10
V
5
(3) 7
V
6
(3) 6
V
7
(3) 14
V
8
(3) 16
V
9
(3) 10
V10
(3) 8
V
11
(3) 7
V
12
(3) 11
 
Figure 2. The hierarchy structure of the IPTN system and 
associated artificial networks of the first three levels. 
 
defined at each layer. The artificial network a
the hierarchy is described as a graph  
with , where is the number of levels of the 
hierarchy. We use  to represent the artificial node i  
  for 1, 2, , li    at level l, which corresponds to a 
cluster of real network nodes. Artificial nodes are con- 
nected by artificial links  
    for 1,2, , andl lijE i i j   , 
composed by those actual network links connecting (in 
parallel) the actual nodes in the clusters forming the arti- 
ficial nodes,  
      ,l lij st s i t jE e v V v V   l . 
The connection pattern between artificial nodes at level l 
is illustrated by an adjacency matrix  lA whose element  
      , 1l l li jA V V   if ,  lijE  
i.e. if in the artificial nodes  and  liV  ljV  there is at 
least one actual link connecting two actual nodes, and 0 
otherwise. 
Figure 2 presents the hierarchy structure of the IPTN 
system and the artificial networks associated with the 
first 3 levels of the hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy 
(i.e. l = 1), the network is a single unit, i.e. one artificial 
node , which consist of all actual nodes. At the sec- 
ond level 
 1
1V  2l  , we have 
          2 2 2 21 2 3 4, , ,V V V V  2  
and           2 2 2 2 213 14 34 24, , ,E E E E E  
with .          2 2 2 21 2 3 4 1, , ,V V V V V
t level l of       ,l l lG E
1 l L  L l
iV
1
theoretical analysis and the ability to compute different 
The integer that is indicated in the Figure in proximity 
of the generic i-th artificial node  indicates the 
number of actual nodes which compose it, e.g.  is 
representative of a group of 38 actual network nodes. 
Note that at the bottom of the hierarchy, we find the ori- 
ginal network, i.e. each artificial node is an actual node 
and each artificial edge corresponds to an actual link. 
 2
iV  2
1V
The hierarchical model offers different levels of reso- 
lution at the different levels of the hierarchy. The artifi-
cial networks at the top of the hierarchy contain limited 
detail information of the local connectivity patterns (in 
the limit, only one node represents the whole network at 
the first level of the hierarchy); as we move down the 
hierarchy, more local information enters the model, at the 
expense of an increase in the dimension of the network. 
These characteristics can be leveraged efficiently to ma- 
nage the complexity of a complex network system. 
3. Reliability Analysis Based on the  
Hierarchical Model 
It is known that most network reliability problems are 
NP-hard and therefore there is a significant gap between 
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reliability parameters for large or even moderate network 
systems [11]. In this respect, hierarchical modeling sets 
up a framework based on which reliability and vulner- 
ability characteristics of complex network systems can be 
computed efficiently, thanks to the multi-scaled informa- 
tion representation scheme. 
3.1. Terminal-Pairs Reliability Assessment 
oblem The terminal-pair or node-pair reliability (TPR) pr
amounts to determining the probability of successful 
communication between a specified source node and a 
terminal node in a network, given the probability of suc- 
cess of each link and node in the network. Let us intro- 
duce a binary vector  1 1, , , , ,k M NS x x y y    to rep- 
resent the state of the network, i.e. the state x of each of 
its M  edges and the state y  of each of its N  nodes, 
wher 1ix   if edge ie  is perating and 0 herwise 
( y  for node). For simp icity of illustration, we assume 
that nodes cannot fail, while edges can (thus y  is no 
longer considered hereafter). The state of the network is 
defined as being non-failure if the specified terminal-pair 
is connected by at least one path of operating edges; oth- 
erwise it is failure. All possible failure states are in- 
cluded in the subset 
 
 o  ot
l
e 
F  of the set   containing all 
possible scenarios (fail  and non-failure). An inclusive 
TPR analysis requires considering all elements in 
ure
F . 
We then define the TPR as: 
  PrR S 1 ,sd sd k kS           (3) 
where sd   is a binary function which indicates the connection availability between node-pair s and d (1 = 
connection; 0 = no-connection). Let us assume that each 
edge ie  has associated a probability ip  of being oper- 
ating and a probability 1i iq p   of being failed; then, 
the TPR of the network c ulated as: an be calc
 1 1
k F i f i f
sd i
S x X x X
R p
  
     
    ip        (4) 
where 
 
ix  represents the state of network edge  and ie
fX  is the set of failed edges for a given state k FS  . 
 that the implicit assumption underpinning  
(4) is that the network edges are independent. 
When the computational cost of the network is hig
Note  uationEq
h (it 
grows exponentially with the number of network com- 
ponents), then, the artificial network at a suitable level of 
the hierarchy can be leveraged to carry out the TPR. At 
the generic level of the hierarchy, the artificial link  lijE  connecting nodes (clusters)  liV  and  ljV  is comp
by actual network links in par l,  
 
osed 
alle
  ,l lE e v V v    lij st s i t jV ; 
then, the reliability of the artificial edge  at level l  lijE
can be calculated by: 
   1lijp E         ;  ,l
st ij
st s i t j
e E
q e v V v V

   l l   (5) 
where  stq e  
k 
indicates the failure probability of the ac- 
tual lin ste that in the real network connects nodes sv  
and tv . 
Va u orithms to solve the classic TPR problem 
ha
rio s alg
ve been reported in literature, with various computa- 
tional efficiencies [29-31]. A so-called Modified Dotson 
algorithm [30], which has been claimed and tested to 
subdue others in computational time, is used here for the 
TPR assessment based on the hierarchical modeling. The 
failure probability of the transmission lines in the IPTN 
system is computed based on outage statistics provided 
in [32], by assuming that the edge failure probability is 
proportional to its length with an average failure rate 
1.380635   occ/100 mile-year, and average outage 
du t = 64.81 hours/occ. 
In Figure 3 right-panel, the connection reliability be- 
tw
ration time 
een nodes 1 and 127 in the IPTN network system (left 
panel in Figure 3) is shown as resulting from evaluations 
at each of the five levels of the hierarchical model de- 
scribed in the previous section. The right panel of Fig- 
ure 3 gives the probabilities of connectivity failure be- 
tween nodes 1 and 127 from level 2 to level 5 (top) and  
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Figure 3. Illustrative example of terminal pair reliability as
sessment of IPTN system. 
- 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                AJOR 
Y. P. FANG, E. ZIO 106 
the computational time needed for the analysis (bottom); 
the values have been normalized with respect to the ma- 
ce Measures 
ximum values of connectivity failure probability and 
computational time, which occur at the bottom of the hie- 
rarchy (level 5) corresponding to the whole network. The 
result at the first level has not been shown since its value 
is simply 0, i.e., node 1 and 127 are in a single unit and 
will not disconnect. One can see that the difference be- 
tween the actual and estimated failure probabilities de- 
creases as the assessment moves downs to the bottom of 
the hierarchy, balanced by the computation time which 
instead increases significantly. The decision maker can 
obtain satisfying estimations of the failure probability at 
a hierarchical level of lower complexity, e.g. level 3, thus 
saving significantly in computation time. 
3.2. Component Extended Importan
Component importance measures are widely used in sys- 
tem engineering to identify components within the sys- 
tem that most significantly influence the system behavior 
with respect to reliability, risk and/or safety. The indica- 
tions drawn are valuable for establishing direction and 
prioritization of actions, related to reliability improve- 
ment during system design and optimization of operation 
and maintenance.  
A well known IM is the so called Birnbaum IM de- 
fined as (with reference to system reliability sR , as the 
system performance indicator) [14]: 
 1B si s i sRI R R R     0i
i
R
R
        (6) 
where BiI  is the Birnbaum Importance (BI) of compo- 
nent i; sR represents the reliability of the system; iR  is 
the reliability of component i ;  1s iR R   is the system 
reliability calculated assuming that component i is er- 
fectly operating and  0s iR R
 p  the system reliability 
in the opposite case of component i failed. The BI meas- 
ures the significance of component i to system reliability 
by the rate at which system reliability improves with the 
reliability of component i. As shown in Equation (6), the 
BI of component i does not depend on iR  itself, so that two components i and j may have a similar value BI  
although they have different reliability values iR  and 
jR , respectively; this could be seen as a limitation of BI. 
The Criticality Importance (CI) measure overcomes 
 above limitation by considering component unreliabi- the
lity [17]. It is defined as: 
   BI 1C ii i s i 1 0 is i
s s
F R
I I R R R R
F F
       (7) 
where 
  
iF  is the unreliability of component i and sF  is 
the system unreliability. Now, a less reliable com  
 B
a 
co
ponent
is more critical than another one with same value of I. 
Fuessell & Vesely [15] proposed an alternative impor- 
tance measure according to which the importance of 
mponent in the system depends on the number and on 
the order of the cut sets in which it appears [17]. Most 
commonly used as a risk reduction indicator, Fuessell & 
Vesely Importance (FVI) quantifies the maximum dec- 
rement in system reliability caused by a particular com- 
ponent being failed  0iR  : 
 0iFV
i
R R
I s s
s
R
R
                (8) 
The previously proposed IMs (B
functionally different. They evaluate subtly different 
pr
m, we intro- 
du
I, CI and FVI) are 
operties of the system behavior, and therefore, are of- 
ten used in a complementary fashion to infer different 
information. To apply the IMs for analyzing a network 
system such as the IPTN, it is necessary to extend the 
definition of the IMs to account for the multiple terminal 
or node pairs (e.g. generator-distributor pairs) where con- 
nectivity defines the network functionality. 
Specializing such extension for the analysis of the im- 
portance of components of the IPTN syste
ce the Extended Birnbaum Importance (EBI) measure 
as the average of all BI values obtained considering all 
possible Generator-Distributor pairs reliabilities in the 
network system: 
   
,
,
   E BiI


1
1 1 0
G D
G D
sd
s V d VG D i
sd i sd i
s V d VG D
R
N N R
R R R R
N N
 
 
 
   


  (9) 
where  and GN DN  
 the 
are the number of generators and 
distrib n network respectively;  and utors i  GV DV  
are sets rators and distributors respectively;  of node gene
sdR  is the TPR between node s and node d;  1sd iR R   
and  0sd iR R  represent the terminal pair reliabilities 
een node s and node d, in the condition  
nent ly operating and completely failed, re- 
spectively. 
Similarly, we can define Extended Criticality Impor- 
tance (ECI)
betw that compo-
i is perfect
 and Extended Fussell & Vesely Importance 
(EFVI) measures: 
   
,
11E C i
i
s V
R
I
N N

 
  1 0 1G D sd i sd id VG D sdR R R R R     
(10) 
 
,
01
G D
sd sd iE FV
i
s V d VG D sd
R R R
I
N N R

 
      
where 
(11) 
E C
iI
  is the Extended Criticality Im
(ECI) m  of component i and 
portance 
easure E FViI
  is the Ex- 
tended l & Vesely Importance measure. Fussel
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nd D
he IPTN 
 the artificial edges of the network at level 2 
of
EC
maintenance and operation optimiza- 
tio
3 
of
in Figure 4 represent the edges of the 
ac
el 2 of the hierarchical model. 
3.3. Numerical Example: Results a iscussions 
The EIMs introduced have been calculated for t
system at different levels of the hierarchical model of the 
system developed. For the evaluation, an artificial node 
functions as a generator as long as there is at least one 
actual generator node within it; otherwise it is simply a 
distributor. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the importance as- 
sessment (EBI, EFVI are given in Table 2 and ECI in 
Table 3) for
 the hierarchy. For EBI and EFVI, all components in 
the artificial network have the same importance rank, but 
with slight differences between EBI and EFVI values, 
and the artificial edge {2-4} is the most important in the 
artificial network (see the bottom panel of Figure 2). 
This is due to the fact that this artificial edge is the only 
possible link between a generator in artificial node  22V  
and the distributors in other artificial nodes, and thus its 
disconnection would cause a large-scale generator-dis- 
tributor connectivity failure. The rank based on the I 
is different from that of EBI and EFVI, and the most im- 
portant artificial edge is {3-4}; the difference lies in the 
definition, as discussed before: EBI depends only on the 
structure of the system and not on the reliability of the 
considered component, whereas ECI takes the unreliabil- 
ity of the component into consideration, and in fact, the 
artificial edge {3-4} is made of only one actual edge with 
relatively high probability of failure, which leads to the 
highest ECI value. 
By combining the indications of EBI and ECI, it is ad- 
visable to offer advices to the decision maker for the 
purpose of system 
n [10]. When EBI & EFVI is high and ECI is low like 
in the case of artificial edge {2-4}, the system safety can 
be improved by protecting against failure of each com- 
ponent, e.g., adding alternative edges between artificial 
node  22V  and node  21V  (or  23V ). For the case of 
low E  EFVI and  ECI ificial edge {3-4}), 
the decision maker should invest in improvements of the 
component itself, to decrease the failure probability. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the evaluation results at level 
 
Table 2. EBI and EFVI at lev
BI & high (art
 the hierarchy. Fictitious edge {4-9}, composed by 
actual edges {110-111, 112-114, 107-109}, has highest 
EBI and EFVI values but relatively low ECI value 
(ranked 15th among all 17 artificial edges), indicating 
that the system reliability is highly sensitive to its failure, 
whereas the component itself is relatively reliable. On the 
contrary, the artificial edge {1-10} composed by only 
one actual edge {64-78} is highly unreliable itself, and 
its EBI and EFVI values are both ranked 8th among all 
17 edges. It is important to pay attention to these artifi- 
cial edges with both relatively high EBI & EFVI ranks 
and ECI ranks, which means not only that their failures 
cause a significant deterioration of the system reliability 
but also that they are vulnerable themselves. In this re- 
spect, by combining Tables 4 and 5, we find that artifi- 
cial edges {1-11} (whose actual network link is {71-83}), 
{6-10} (which is composed by actual link {76-79}), and 
{10-12} (which is composed by actual links {75-88, 
80-95}) are the three artificial edges most critical for the 
system reliability. 
The bold edges 
tual network system which have resulted most critical 
based on the extended importance measure evaluation 
carried out at level 3 of the hierarchy model. These edges 
should be paid special attention. For links {110-111, 
112-114, 107-109}, improving the defense in depth against 
EBI EFVI 
Artificial Edge 
Rank Value Rank Value 
Associated Actual Edges 
{2-4} 1 0.3750 1 0. {1 } 3750 07-109, 112-114, 110-111
{1-4} 2 1.9606E 1.9605E
{59-60, 31} 
−03 2 −03 {64-78, 71-83} 
{1-3} 3 1.4817E−03 3 1.4817E−03  61-62, 30-34, 30-
{3-4} 4 1.5100E−05 4 1.4900E−05 {76-79} 
 
ECI at level 2 of the hierarchical model. 
Artificial Edges Associated Actual Edges 
Table 3. 
Rank ECI 
{2-4} 4 0.37 {107-109, 112-114, 110-111} 
{1-4} 2 7699 62 
{59-60, 31} 
{3-4} 1 7699828.67 {76-79} 
812. {64-78, 71-83} 
{1-3} 3 16.55  61-62, 30-34, 30-
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Table 4. EBI and EFVI at level 3 of the hierarchical mod
EBI 
el. 
EFVI 
Artificial Edges 
Rank 
Associated Actual Edges 
Value Rank Value 
{4-9} 1 0.2867 1 0.2879 {110-111, 112-114, 107-109} 
{4-5} {119-122} 
{  {7 } 
1.  1.  
1.  1.  
{30-31 9-60} 
{  
{  
{10-1 -21} 
2 0.1591 2 0.1591 
{9-12} 3 0.0030 3 0.0030 {98-99, 94-97, 97-98} 
10-12} 4 0.0028 4 0.0028 5-88, 80-95
{2-3} 5 0.0007 5 0.0007 {42-43, 40-43} 
{1-11} 6 0.0002 6 0.0002 {71-83} 
{6-10} 7 55E−05 7 54E−05 {76-79} 
{1-10} 8 17E−05 8 15E−05 {64-78} 
{3-8} 9 8.04E−06 9 8.05E−06 , 30-34, 5
{9-11} 10 7.52E−06 10 7.38E−06 102-110}
11-12} 11 4.82E−06 11 4.65E−06 {86-88} 
{7-8} 12 4.11E−06 12 4.11E−06 6, 10-21, 20
{1-2} 13 3.00E−06 13 2.98E−06 {47-48} 
{1-3} 14 8.43E−08 14 8.40E−08 {40-41, 60-63} 
{1-6} 15 7.58E−08 16 5.56E−08 {61-62} 
{6-7} 16 5.58E−08 15 4.96E−08 {11-12, 12-13} 
{6-8} 17 1.43E−08 17 3.92E−08 {59-61} 
 
 
Figure 4. Most critical edges at level 3 of the hierarchical model. 
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Table 5. The results of ECI assessment at level 3 of the hierarchical model. 
Artificial Edges Rank ECI Associated Actual Edges 
{1-10} 1 3029896 {64-78} 
{6-10} 2 2975998 {76-79} 
{1-11} 3 2763614 {71-83} 
{10-12} 4 139883.50 {75-88, 80-95} 
{11-12} 5 45071.41 {86-88} 
{6-8} 6 24763.84 {59-61} 
{1-6} 7 20374.07 {61-62} 
{1-2} 8 13626.99 {47-48} 
{1-3} 9 212.10 {40-41, 60-63} 
{6-7} 10 196.24 {11-12, 12-13} 
{2-3} 11 57.85 {42-43, 40-43} 
{3-8} 12 10.65 {30-31, 30-34, 59-60} 
{7-8} 13 0.38 {10-16, 10-21, 20-21} 
{4-5} 14 0.16 {119-122} 
{4-9} 15 0.07 {110-111, 112-114, 107-109} 
{9-11}
{9-12} 17 0.02 {98-99, 94-97, 97-98} 
 16 0.05 {102-110} 
 
their failures is ad  to improve the reliability
system, while fo  {64-78, 71 3, 76-79, 
75-88}, the edge unreliability should also be mitigated. 
Tables 6 and 7  the results of the EIMs e
tion at level 4 o TN hierarch l model. I
out that artificia 7-11} (corr onding to 
link {119-122}) ha highest EB and EFVI 
and artificial edg 2} (correspo g to actu
{64-78}) has the st ECI rank and relativel
EBI and EFVI ranks, indicating its criticality to syste
reliability. 
Finally, Table orts the com utation time
quired for the calculations of the EIM t different 
in the hierarchy: as expected, the m  go down in 
the hierarchy the higher the computation time. 
4. Conclusions 
The modeling and analysis of comp network sys
is a non-trivial task. Related decisio aking regardi  
reliability and vu ility is limited by computati
resources.  
In this work, we ha ntroduced a ramework for  
erarchical modeli omplex netw  systems, w
ads to the definition of different varied-size grained 
 
model is obtained by rsive unsupervised spectral 
clustering method. T odel thereby ob- 
tained provides a multi-scaled representation of the ori- 
ginal network system ore detailed information but 
high complexity a els of the hierarchy, and 
simplified structure but relatively low complexity at the 
higher levels. The availability of different scales of mod- 
eling resolution allow anagement of the ana- 
lysis, at the level of d esired for its purposes. The 
380 kV Italian Power Tr n Network (IPTN) has 
been taken as an illus
Furthermore, Im ures (IMs) such as Birn- 
baum, Fuessell & Vesely and Criticality, have been ex- 
tended for application to t inal-pair reliability pro- 
blem in complex d ork systems.  
The calculati s at different levels 
of the hierarchical sy  has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of chical modeling, with 
the IM-ranking of th ents offering insights on 
how to impro lures of most criti- 
cal elements. 
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Table 6. EBI and EFVI at level 4 of the hierarchical model (only the top 20 elements are reported). 
EFVI EBI 
Artificial Edges 
Rank Value Rank Value 
Associated Actual Edges 
{7-11} 1 0.1504 1 0.1511 {119-122} 
{3-4} 2 0.0787 2 
{10-11} 3 0.0782 3 
{22-23} 4 4.2717E−4 4 
0.0788 {47-49, 51-54} 
0.0788 {125-126} 
4.2606E−4 {78-81} 
{21-27} 18 3.22E−05 18 
{7-8} 19 3.07E−05 19 
{24-25} 5 3.5490E−4 5 
{12-13} 6 3.3570E−4 6 
{1-22} 7 3.0044E−4 7 
{21-28} 8 2.1515E−4 
3.5551E−4 {84-101, 85-101} 
3.3605E−4 {14-73, 14-76} 
2.9915E−4 {64-78} 
2.1436E−4 {94-97} 8 
1.7038E−4 9 
10 1.6962E−4 10 
88} 
5.09E−05 {107-109} 
{110-111} 
3.23E−05 {97-98, 98-99} 
3.07E−05 {113-120} 
{8-2
{26-28} 9 
{2-25} 
1.6954E−4 {92-93} 
1.6906E−4 {71-83} 
1.0206E−4 {17-18} 
7.51E−05 {10-16} 
6.43E−05 {75-
{17-19} 11 1.0216E−4 11 
{14-19} 12 7.53E−05 12 
{23-29} 13 6.50E−05 13 
{7-21} 14 5.10E−05 14 
{9-20} 15 4.24E−05 16 
{23-27} 16 3.74E−05 15 
{13-23} 17 3.36E−05 17 
4.22E−05 
3.66E−05 {80-95} 
3.35E−05 {76-79} 
0} 20 2.64E−05 20 2.61E−05 {112-114} 
 
able  at level e hierarch odel (only th ements a
rtificial Edg R ECI Associated Actu
T 7. ECI  4 of th ical m e top 20 el re reported). 
A es ank al Edges 
{1-22} 1 094.790 {64-78} 868
{2-4} 2 781.848 {47-48} 
{1-12} 3 490.646 {61-62} 
{13-23} 4 088.015 {76-
{22-23} 5 356.820 {78-81} 
{12-14} 6 54.9988 {12-13} 
{14-18} 7 48.7434 {10-21} 
{14-15} 8 14.4150 {7-9} 
{14-19} 9 37.9590 {10-16} 
{17-19} 10 31.1229 {17-18} 
{12-13} 11 38.4808 {14-73,14-7
{12-18} 12 9.8833 {59-61} 
{1-5} 13 5.1115 {40-41,60-
{5-16} 14 3.8315 {30-31} 
{16-18} 15 5.8073 {27-59} 
{6-16} 16 1.5230 {30-34} 
{5-18} 17 6252 {59-60} 
{15-18} 18 7982 {20-21} 
{12-15} 19 1408 {11-12} 
{4-5} 20 325.9829 {40-43} 
750
737
645 79} 
602
445
437
409
231
170
141 6} 
882
628 63} 
601
523
505
4665.
2481.
1666.
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Table 8. EIMs evaluation time at each level of the hierar- 
chical model. 
Co conds on  with 2 CPU 
3.06 G 3.07 G)
mputation time (se  a computer
 EIMs 
Lev Level Level 4 el 2 3 
EBI 0.3856 108.5 31763.58 
EFVI 0.2086 112.2 32179.50 
ECI 0.5152 175.0 47621.58 
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